Several quantum versions of the battle of the sexes game are analyzed. Some of them are shown to reproduce the classical game. In some, there are no Nash quantum pure equilibria. In some others, the payoffs are always equal to each other. In others still, all equilibria favor Alice or Bob depending on a phase shift of the initial state of the system. Explicit detailed calculations are for the first time exhibited.
Introduction
Since Meyer´s [1] idea of quantizing classical games, a flood of papers have been published on this theme. Although that author´s motivation was to explore the mathematical resemblance between mixed strategies and quantum superposition, the strongest argument in favor of this line of research is the pending question about the possibility of existence of quantum algorithms computationally more efficient then classical ones for the solution of large sequential games (like chess, for instance); research in this line is described in [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] and [6] . If such algorithms do exist, they must be applied to a quantum version of the classical game, thus requiring the fidelity of the former to the late one.
Several quantum versions for the battle of the sexes game have been proposed [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] . Benjamin and Hayden [11] recommend Eisert´s [12] quantization scheme, which computes the final state as |E f = J † (U A ⊗ U B ) J|E i , because it generalizes correctly the classical game. Here, this last framework is used. Firstly, the operator J is set equal to Eisert´s with γ = π 2 (which totally entangles the qubits) and four cases are analyzed: (3, 3) , meaning unrestricted U A and U B (each one thus defined by three real numbers); (2, 2) , which is the restricted version used by Eisert; (2,1), in which one of the players uses a restricted quantum operator and the other can only use classical ones; and (1,1), which corresponds to the classical game. Then, J is set to the identity and the results for some initial states |E i are obtained; the interesting cases here are when |E i is an entangled state combining the two pure equilibria of the classical game.
The classical game
Alice and Bob are dating and want to go out together on Saturday night. But Bob prefers to go to the football , whilst Alice prefers to go to the ballet. Each one prefers to go with the other to the show (s)he doesn´t like instead of going alone to the show (s)he likes. The following table may represent the personal satisfaction (payoff) of each player in the four possible situations: Bob
Lines represent Alice´s choices and columns, Bob´s. The first entry in each ordered pair is Alice´s payoff and the second one, Bob´s. The decisions have to be made simultaneously, independently and thoroughly followed.
This game has two pure equilibria: FF and BB and a mixed one, in which Alice chooses ballet with probability 2 3 and Bob chooses football with probability 
Quantization
The two possible choices (F or B) can be associated with the direction (up or down) of the spin of the nucleus of a carbon 13 atom, for instance, embedded in a magnetic field. Suppose Alice and Bob control, each, one atom. Two initial states are considered here (of the four possible ones): |FF and |BB , corresponding to the pure equilibria of the classical game. The judge entangles the qubits with the aid of the operator 
J|BB , the final states in function of these angles become: it is possible to write
The restriction β = δ = 0, used by some authors results on:
Further restriction α = γ = 0 reduces to the classical case
The asymmetric game, in which Alice can use restricted quantum operators and Bob, only classical ones, is obtained by imposing γ = 0 on the 2 × 2 quantum case, resulting on:
where z = sin α 4 Analysis 4.1 Case 3×3
As remarked by Du et. al. [7] , the totally entangled 3 × 3 case doesn´t have pure quantum equilibria (mixed quantum equilibria, defined by way of probability measures over the set of admissible density matrices, may exist -in fact, Lee and Jonhson [13] seem to have proved they always do). The argument here goes as follows: define u = xy = cos 
Let z = sin ρ and w = sin σ. Then The same analysis applies to |E F F .
Case 2×2
The payoffs in this case are:
where (F F ) and (BB) indicate the initial state |E i of the system. It is sufficient to notice that, in the case FF, Alice can always annulate the first term by setting x = 0, which results in $ A = 2$ B , giving Bob no other choice then agreeing to maximize the second term, which is accomplished by setting y = 0, resulting in $ B = 1. As Alice can never expect to get a payoff bigger then 2, the resulting profile gives no incentive to change for the members of the couple, thus being a Nash equilibrium. In the case BB, it is Bob who has the couteau and the fromage, being able to annulate the second term, by setting y = 0, leaving Alice no choice other then choosing x = 0 to maximize her payoff.
Reminding that x = cos 
with the same definitions of u and v as before. Then
Alice´s payoff is maximized at the extremities |z| = 1; Bob´s, on z = v u . As neither can control z independently, whatever value one sets to z the other one can unset. As a consequence, in any equilibrium, they must agree as to the best value of z. This will be the case only if 
recalling that these equilibria, as the former ones, give 2 to Alice and 1 to Bob. Given the symmetry, the analysis of |E BB follows the same lines. In this case, all equilibria give 2 to Bob and 1 to Alice.
What is new here, besides the explicitation of the analysis, is the comparison between the two cases, FF and BB, showing that the simple interchange of i = e i π 2 in the components of the state J|E i , changes completely the balance of a game otherwise symmetrical. That is: define the system being controlled by the players by the pair (J, |G i ), where |G i = J|E i ; then, a change from
√ 2 turns a game totally favorable to Alice to one totally favorable to Bob.
Case 2×1
In this case, the operators available for the players are: With the same definitions as before, the only difference being that now z = sin α, which gives it total control by Alice, the analysis is the following:
The first and fourth components of the final quantum state |E F F are:
The payoffs become, with the definitions of u and v already given:
As $ A (z) is a parable upwards, Alice always chooses |z| = 1. Then, The maximum value of this expression is 1, attained a ω = −θ + 2kπ, k ∈ Z. Particularly, for θ, ω ∈ {π + 2kπ|k ∈ Z}, U A and U B become independent from α, so that this parameter is free.
When |E i = |BB , the final state has the following first and fourth components: Thus, Bob tries to maximize |uz + v| and Alice, |−uz + v| . Both are simultaneously maximized only when uz = 0. As z = 0, u must be annulated, which any player has the power to do unilaterally. So, in the equilibria, u=0 and the payoffs become
The players coordinate to maximize |v| by setting |x| = |y| = 1. As v = 0 and u = 0, the hypothesis
, 1] is still valid. As u=0, z becomes irrelevant, which frees α. The result is 2 to Bob and 1 to Alice. This case, having only three real parameters, allows the graphical illustration below, showing the sets of Nash equilibria in the parameter space. Figure 1 : Quantum Alice versus classical Bob -points of the parameter space belonging to the bold straight segments are the Nash equilibria of this quantum version of the battle of the sexes game. The initial state is FF. All equilibria favor Alice ($ A = 2, $ B = 1). Vertical axis is ω, horizontal is θ and the one perpendicular to the page is α. bold straight segments are Nash equilibria of this quantum version of the battle of the sexes game. The initial state is BB. Most equilibria favor Bob ($ A = 1, $ B = 2). In the isolate points shown, the equilibrium favors Alice ($ A = 2, $ B = 1). Vertical axis is ω, horizontal is θ and the one parallel to the bold straight lines is α.
Some simpler models
Marinatto and Weber [10] analyzed the non-entangled case, where J = I (the identity operator, obtained by setting γ = 0 in J´s formula) with initial state |BB , without restrictions on the parameters set. The final state is given by If the initial state is |F F , the situation changes to:
to control a system; thus, they are defined by the system and the way the players are connected to it; if any of these change, the game changes; as a consequence, it is arguable if its name should be kept. To name "battle of the sexes" games with completely different qualitative features may not be reasonable.
